The view that the brain computes is a working hypothesis in cognitive and brain sciences. But what does it mean to say that a system computes? What distinguishes computing systems, such as desktops and brains, from (arguably) non-computing systems, such as stones, stomachs and tornadoes? This question has generated an intense and lively discussion in recent years, and, as expected, there is no consensus over the answer. In fact, it is far from clear that there is only a single notion in play; it might well be the case that the term "computation" invokes very different notions in different contexts.
mathematical relations, defined over the representing states, and "outer" mathematical relations, defined over the represented states.
The structural-digital view
The claim that something computes goes beyond the use of computational models. Neuroscientists and cognitive scientists not only use computational models to study the nervous system but often claim, in addition, that the modeled system itself e.g., the brain, computes. What do they mean by this further claim?
Many hold that the distinction between computing and noncomputing has something to do with the structure of the (computing) mechanism. Computing mechanisms have a special structure that is not shared by many of the non-computing mechanisms. Let us call this approach the structural view of computing. The proponents of the structural view tend to associate computing with types of digital structures. They take it that to compute a function is to follow some rule or algorithm or effective procedure; to execute a program; to implement an automaton; or to manipulate symbols (e.g., digits). This comes down to having the form of step-by-step, rule-governed, or discrete processes (this is, perhaps, in contrast to non-computing mechanisms that are often non-discrete, continuous, governed by dynamical equations, and so on).
The structural approach comes in different flavors. Newell and Simon (1976) famously associate a computer with a "physical symbol system", which "is capable of having and manipulating symbols, yet is also realizable within our physical universe" (Newell 1980: 38) . This characterization of computing highlights two non-structural conditions. One is that the system is realizable in some physical structure that obeys the laws of physics. The other is that the system operates on symbols that are "interpretable" in one way or another. Yet when they come to elaborate on their notion they associate a physical symbol system with "a specific architectural" structure (1976: 42), which Newell, later on, describes in terms of five subsystems: memory, operators, control, input and output (Newell 1980: 45; see also Harnish 2002: 396-7) .
Fodor characterizes computational processes as formal, namely, that "they apply to representations in virtue of (roughly) the syntax of representations" (1980: 309). Fodor does not say what exactly the syntactic properties are, but he very often associates them with certain "Classical" architectures: "The emphasis upon the syntactical character of thought suggests a view of cognitive processes… as occurring in a languagelike medium, a sort of 'language of thought '" (1994:9) . Having this structure, computing systems are "automatic formal systems" (Haugeland 1981b) in the sense that they reliably preserve truth (Fodor 1994: 8-9) . Cummins (1989) also emphasizes that computations operate on symbols, i.e., entities with semantic values. Yet he argues that there are mapping processes from symbols to symbols that compute the mapping functions, and there are mapping processes that only satisfy the functions but do not compute. Computations, according to Cummins, are those processes that involve program execution and, as such, have the unique structure of step-by-step form: "To compute a function g is to execute a program that gives o as its output i just in case g(i) = o. Computing reduces to program execution…. Program execution reduces to stepsatisfaction" (Cummins 1989: 91-92) .
More recently, Piccinini (2007 Piccinini ( , 2008a ) advances a forceful structural account of computing. According to this account, computation "is the generation of output strings of digits from input strings of digits in accordance with a general rule that depends on the properties of the strings and (possibly) on the internal state of the system" (2008a: 34; see also 2007: 501). This account is "purely structural" in that it does not require a semantic condition. Computing processes operate on entities that could be interpreted in one way or another, but it is not essential for them to have semantic values (Piccinini 2008b ). The only constraint on computing is structural: the condition being that computing processes manipulate inputs in accordance with a rule defined over the input types and their place within strings (2007: 521) .
There is much to commend the structural-digital view of computing. It is in accord with the notion used in theoretical computer science, especially in computability and automata theory. It can be easily associated with central works in Classical AI (Newell and Simon) and in Cognitive Science (Chomsky 1957) . It can be located within the current framework of functional explanations (Haugeland 1978 ), Cummins 1985 and mechanistic explanations (Craver 2007 ), Bechtel 2008 . And, it is associated with the functionalist view that is so influential in philosophy of mind (Block 1995) . Yet it has also one major defect: It is at odds with much of the work in connectionist cognitive science and computational neuroscience.
A critique of the structural-digital view
The structural-digital view can be criticized on various grounds. One could argue that there is no precise definition of digitality, and thus of the digital/non-digital distinction (and does "non-digital" mean "continuous", "analog", or "dynamical"?); see discussion in Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller, (this volume, section 5). My criticism, however, is different. I do not think it is essential to have a precise definition of digitality. There are many useful notions in science -e.g., length, species, cells -for which there is no precise definition. It is enough to have a characterization of digital that makes sense of paradigm examples and excludes the obvious non-digital cases; and indeed there are such characterizations (see, e.g., Haugeland 1981c).
Another line of criticism is that the notion of digitality is vacuous, since, at one level or another, every physical system can be seen as a digital computer (Searle 1992 ; see also Putnam 1988) . But, again, this is not my criticism against the structural-digital conception. In fact, I think that this line of criticism is not very effective, and I discuss it at some length elsewhere (Shagrir 2010) . My criticism, rather, is that there is an important class of systems that are not seen as having digital structure yet are described as computing systems. As a matter of fact, I argue, structure -any structure -is not a necessary constraint on computing.
To make the point, let us consider a specific example of a computing nervous tissue that is in charge of holding the eyes still. The brain moves the eyes with quick saccadic movements. Between saccades, it keeps the eyes still (Leigh and Zee 2006) . The brain can do this by storing a memory of eye-positions, known as oculomotor integrator (Robinson 1989) . The brain's memory of horizontal eye-position appears to be implemented by a persistent neural activity, which is spread over several areas in the brainstem and cerebellum. Different experimental studies show that this system converts transient eye-velocity-encoding inputs into persistent eye-position-encoding outputs. It is concluded that the system locates the new eye-position by computing integration on the pulse saccadic inputs with respect to time. The motor neurons, reading out the memory, keep the eyes still in the new location.
In the language of state space analysis, the oculomotor integrator moves from one state, Si, which represents one eye-position, Ei, to another state, Sj, which represents another eye-position, Ej, by performing integration on eye-velocity-encoding inputs I ( fig. 1) : Fig. 1 . The dynamics of the oculomotor memory: The system consists of stable states S i , each representing a different eye-position E i . The system moves from one state, say S 1 , to another state, say S 2, by integrating on pulse saccadic inputs, I, which encode eye-velocity.
How does this system compute integration in arriving at a new position? The experimental findings show that when the eyes are still, the pattern of neural activity in the memory is constant in time, and that for every eye-position, the pattern of activity is different and persistent. This persistence is thus explained in terms of a multi-stable recurrent network with a continuous line attractor dynamics (Canon & Robinson 1985; Seung 1996 Seung , 1998 ; the continuity is required for consistency with the analog, graded encoding of the eye-position in the neural activity. Each point along the line encodes a horizontal eye-position. A novel input destabilizes the network, which gradually stabilizes at a new point along the attractor line; this point encodes the current eye position.
The theoreticians' work nicely exemplifies the difficulties confronting the structural-digital conception. Firstly, it challenges the element of digitality in the conception. The integrating mechanism is at odds with the idea that computing has to do with digital structure. It is true that the network consists of separable cells, but the activation of cells is continuous and is described in terms of differential equations. Moreover, the space of "states", S i , is not discrete in the sense that they are "separable" attractors; the space, rather, is "dense" in that it is a continuous line of attractors, whereas each point on the line represents a different eye-position. In addition, the dynamics of the network is not, in any obvious sense, algorithmic or rule-governed or step-satisfaction. The dynamics is a continuous relaxation on the next stable state, which is described in terms of minimization of the energy landscape. In short, the dynamics is no more digital than the dynamics of any other system whose dynamics is described in terms of interaction between its elements, e.g., elementary particles. Secondly, the model challenges the more general structural idea, namely, that the distinction between computing and non-computing has to do with the structure of the process. The oculomotor integrator is a dynamical system that has the structure of many physical dynamics that we consider as non-computing, e.g., the dynamics of the volume of a flowing liquid into a container. It has no obvious structural property that distinguishes it from all the non-computing dynamics. Even the language used to describe the dynamics is not the language of automata or computability theory. The model describes the integrating process in the language of control theory and dynamical theory, which is the same language that is used to describe many non-computing dynamical systems. So, all in all, it is very difficult to see what could be a relevant structural difference between computing and non-computing. Structure, it seems, contributes nothing to the distinction between computing and non-computing.
The modeling view
The modeling view starts with the observation that computation operates with information or on representations: "a physical system is considered a computer when its states can be taken as representing states of some other system" (Churchland, Koch and Sejnowski 1990: 48) . But computation goes beyond this "semantic condition". It also has something to do with "formality", at least in the sense that computational descriptions are not sensitive to every difference in content. Our oculomotor integrator is a good example of the importance of the "formality condition". Some argue that the very same integrator also serves for another purpose. It serves to compute the desired eye-position from the velocity of the head-movement and as such serves as the computational basis of the VOR operation (Robinson 1989 , Goldman et al. 2002 . Still, we can notice that although the content of the representation is different, the computational description is the same. The content is different, since in one case the machine operates on representations whose content is eye-velocity and eye-position (oculomotor memory), whereas in the other case, the content of representations has to do with head-velocity and desired eye-position. Nevertheless, in both cases we count the operations as the performance of the same computation --namely, integration -regardless of the specific information content of the physical signals.
The modeling account, then, respects a formality condition. However, it does not conceive this formality condition as a structural constraint, i.e., that the process is algorithmic, rule-governed, and so on. The modeling account conceives of the formality constraint in terms of modeling. To see what modeling means here let us look again at the oculomotor integrator. We can observe that the term ∫I(t)d(t) describes two different relations: One is the mapping relation between the stable states of the neural network (oculomotor integrator), Si and Sj, and the other is between the eye-positions, Ei and Ej, that are being represented by these states. The term I refers, at one level, to the transient saccadic electrical inputs to the network and, at the other level, to the eyevelocity. In other words, the mathematical formula of integration describes relations at two different levels. It describes some cellular activity in the brain, but also some relations between the entities that are being represented by these cells (figure 2):
Another way to make this point is to state that the system models the physical world in a very special way: it models certain mathematical relations "in the world" by the mathematical relations defined over the electric cellular activity. There is, as it were, an "isomorphism" between mathematical relations among the states of the modeling system and the formal or mathematical relations between the states of the modeled system. The term "mathematical relations" means that what is being related are mathematical entities like real numbers, geometrical relations, set-theoretic structures and so forth. These entities are mathematical values, magnitudes that abstract from pertinent physical properties. At one level, the function relates numbers that abstract from the representations (e.g., electrical cellular activity). At another, it relates magnitudes that abstract from representational contents (e.g., position and velocity). This idea of modeling is not really new: we can trace it back to the old-fashioned analog computers. A paradigm example is the tidepredicting machine that was designed by Lord Kelvin and constructed in 1873. The machine determined the height of the tides by integrating (i.e., summation) of ten principal components. These components were made by means of teeth-wheels that simulated the motion of the sun, moon, earth and other factors that influence tides (see Kelvin's presentation at http://zapatopi.net/kelvin/papers/the_tides.html). We should notice, however, that the relevant sense of "analog" here is not continuous; computing, on the modeling account, can also be digital. The relevant sense of "analog" is that the mathematical function computed by the system is analogous to mathematical relations in other physical systems, one of which the system models.
This idea of modeling is widespread in computational neuroscience. In analyzing the Zipser and Andersen (1988) 2 ) refers to relations at two different levels. At one (abstract) level, it describes the activity of a certain group of PPC cells as a function of the activity of other, pre-synaptic, activity. At another (abstract) level, the formula refers to some complex mathematical relations between the things that are being represented, namely, eye orientation and stimulus retinotopic location, and the stimulus distance from the preferred direction relative to the head.
Another example is the Marr and Hildreth (1980) computational-level theory of edge-detection (see also Marr 1982, chap. 2) . The relation between the activity of the retinal photoreceptors and the activity of cells in the primary visual cortex (V1) is described in terms of the zerocrossings of the formula ∇ 2 G * I(x,y); I refers to the array of photoreceptors (retinal image), * is a convolution operator, and ∇ 2 G is a filtering operator: G is a Gaussian that blurs the image, and ∇ 2 is the Laplacian operator (∂ 2 /∂x 2 +∂ 2 /∂y 2 ) that is sensitive to sudden intensity changes in the image. The zero-crossings of this formula are precisely those places in the image that have sharp intensity changes. This formula, however, also describes relations between what is being represented by these cells. The formula states that the relations between light intensity values, signified by I, and the light reflectance along physical edges are those of derivation, i.e. that sudden changes in light intensities occur along physical edges such as object boundaries.
We can now characterize a computing system as follows. A computing system has two features: (a) the semantic feature: it is information-processing in the sense that it maps one set of representations to another; and (b) the formality feature: the functional, mathematical relations between its states are similar to the mathematical relations between the entities that are being represented by these states. This is, of course, just a sketch. A detailed account is yet to be worked out, and the scope of the account is yet to be examined. But I hope that I have provided some indication that the modeling direction is more promising than the structural view, at least in the context of the current work in computational neuroscience.
